Daniel M. Schwartz, Bernice L. Schwartz And Alvin I. Smith : M.D. Haltrom And Michael S. Tanner : Brief of Appellant M.D. Haltom by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1977
Daniel M. Schwartz, Bernice L. Schwartz And Alvin
I. Smith : M.D. Haltrom And Michael S. Tanner :
Brief of Appellant M.D. Haltom
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Robert Van Sciver; Attorney for AppellantHarley W. Gustin;
Attorney for Respondents
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Schwartz v. Haltom, No. 14832 (Utah Supreme Court, 1977).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/532
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DANIEL M. SCHWARTZ, BERNICE 
L. SCHWARTZ AND ALVIN I. 
SMITH, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
M. D. HALTOM and MICHAEL 
S. TANNER, 
Defendants- Appellants. 
Case No. 14832 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT M.D. HALTOM 
Appeal from a. judgment entered in the District 
Court of the Third Judicial District, In and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, by the Honorable Ernest 
F. Baldwin, Jr., Judge. 
HARLEY W. GUSTIN 
1610 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Respondents 
ROBERT VAN SCIVER 
321 South Sixth East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Appellant, 
M. D. Haltom 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PROVE BY CLEAR 
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE ALL OF THE ELEMENTS 
OF COMMON LAW FRAUD ON THE PART OF THE 
Page 
1 
1 
1 
2 
APPELLANT, M. D. HALTOM . • . . . . . . . 5 
POINT II 
THE PLAINTIFFS DID NOT EXERCISE DUE CARE 
IN THEIR BUSINESS DEALINGS WITH STAN TANNER 
AND DID NOT HAVE ANY RIGHT TO RELY ON 
THE STATEMENTS . • • . . . . • • 8 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PLAINTIFFS AT 
TRIAL DOES NOT SUSTAIN THE LOWER COURT'S 
FINDING OF APPELLANTS INVOLVEMENT IN A 
CONSPIRACY 10 
CONCLUSION 12 
TABLE OF CASES 
Bezner v. Continental Dry Cleaners, Inc., 548 
P. 2d 898 (Utah 1976) 6 
Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P. 2d 
597 (1962) . . . . . . . . 10 
Elder v. Clawson, 14 Utah 2d 384, P. 2d 802 
(1967) . . . . . . . . 6 
-i-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CASES CONT'D 
Ellis v. Hale, 13 Utah 2d 279, 373 P. 2d 597 
(1962) ..... . 
Harris v. Capital Records, 50 Cal. Rptr. 539, 
413 P. 2d 139 (1966) 
Jardine v. Brunswick Corp., 18 Utah 2d 378, 423 
P. 2d 659, (1967) .•.. 
Lewis v. White, 2 Utah 2d 101, 269 P. 2d 865 
(1954) . • • . . . . ... 
Lundstrom v. Radio Corporation of America, 
17 Utah 2d 114, 405 P. 2d 339 (1965) 
Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P. 2d 273, 
(1952) . . • . . . . . . . 
Tanner v. Pillsbury Mills, 3 Utah 2d 196, 281 
P. 2d 391 (1955) • . • . • . . . . . 
Teamsters, Chauffers & Helpers of America, 
Local 222 v. Board of Review, Department of 
Employment Security, 10 Utah 2d 63, 348 P. · 
2d 588 (1960) . . • . . . . . . . . . . 
MISCELLANEOUS 
23 Arn Jur 850, Fraud and Deceit §85 
-ii-
• 
6 
11 
8 
8 
6, 11 
5 
11 
10 
7 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DANIEL M. SCHWARTZ, BERNICE 
L. SCHWARTZ A.~D ALVIN I. 
SMITH, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
M. D. HALTOM and MICHAEL 
S. TANNER, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No. 14832 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT M.D. HALTOM 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a civil action wherein a judgment was 
entered against the defendants on the basis that through 
their representations they obtained property to which they 
were not entitled and defaulted on the promissory note 
which evidenced such obligation. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Judgement was entered against the defendants, 
jointly and severally. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Appellant, M. o. Haltom, requests the 
Court vacate the judgment entered by the lower court and 
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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that he be awarded his costs herein. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The plaintiffs, Daniel M. Schwartz and Bernice 
L. Schwartz, were owners of a house located at 1792 
Millbrook Road, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, which 
was listed for sale beginning in 1966 when the plaintiffs 
left the State of Utah and established residence in 
California. (T. 14) 
Mr. and Mrs. Schwartz had authorized their 
attorney in Salt Lake City, plaintiff, Alvin L. Smith, 
to receive offers for purchase of the house and relay 
them to California. (T. 100) 
Sometime in November of 1968, the defendant, 
Stan Tanner, defendant, Earl J. Knudson, a real estate 
broker, and appellant, M. D. Haltom, contacted Mr. Smith 
at his office in Salt Lake City, Utah. (T. 102) Mr. 
Haltom indicated that he represented the defendant, Stan 
Tanner, a resident of Phoenix, Arizona (T. 102) and said 
that Stan Tanner wanted to purchase the plaintiffs' house 
in Salt Lake City, which he was going to give to his son, 
Michael S. Tanner. (T.104) Mr. Haltom said any offer from 
Stan Tanner was conditioned upon sale of the house to Stan 
Tanner, free and clear of any mortgage. At this meeting, 
M. D. Haltom, as Stan Tanner's representative, discussed 
with Mr. Smith (T. 112) the possible means of collateralizing 
-2-
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the proposed purchase of the property and made some statements 
regarding Stan Tanner's holding in the stock of several 
corporations. (T. 104 to T. 112) 
On December 8, 1968, Daniel Schwartz met for a 
period of two hours personally with the Appellant in San 
Francisco, California. {T. 15) At this meeting Mr. Haltom 
again indicated that he represented Stan Tanner, who wanted 
to purchase a house in Salt Lake City which he was going 
to give, free and clear, to Michael Tanner to induce the 
Appellant to come to Utah from his residence in Phoenix 
to operate a business in Salt Lake City in which Stan Tanner 
had an interest. {T. 16) Mr. Haltom made an offer on 
behalf of Stan Tanner to purchase the house for $47,000.00 
the price at which it was listed. (T. 17) The balance of 
the purchase price, after payment of an outstanding mortgage 
of $3,000.00 was to be paid by a personal note executed 
by Stan Tanner. {T. 17) Mr. Haltom also stated that 
as security for the note, Stan Tanner would pledge certain 
stock in Bishop Industries Incorporated and other stock. 
(T. 18) During this meeting Mr. Haltom made several 
statements and representations about the above mentioned 
corporation and several other companies, United Equities 
Company and Western St~tes Land of Utah. (T. 18 to 24) 
The plaintiff stated at the trial that at this time he did 
request that Mr. Haltom become involved as a signator to 
the note but that Mr. Haltom refused to sign the note. (T. 81) 
-3-
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On January 2, 1969, Stan Tanner personally executed 
and delivered to the plaintiffs a promissory note in the 
principal amount of $40,643.00 with interest and this 
Note was secured by a pledge of 10,000 shares of common 
stock of Bishop Industries, Inc. and 20,000 shares common 
stock of Western States Land of Utah owned by Stan Tanner. 
(Exhibit 5-D) Contemporaneously, the plaintiffs, Daniel 
and Bernice Schwartz executed a Warranty Deed in favor 
of Michael S. Tanner and Louisa Tanner. (Exhibit 6-D) 
Michael S. Tanner was called as a witness by 
the plaintiff. (T. 154) He testified that in November of 
1968, he came to Salt Lake City to look for homes suitable 
for his family after his father, Stan Tanner had offered 
to purchase for him a home to induce him to live in Salt 
Lake City and to take a position with his father's organi-
zation. (T. 166, 167) Michael Tanner, at this time, selected 
three houses, one of which was the house owned by the plaintif'.' 
(T. 168) He stated that prior to the closing he did not 
have any detailed conversations with either Mr. Haltom or 
Stan Tanner. (T. 183) 
On February 20, 1969, the real property at issue 
was mortgaged by Michael Tanner (T. 172 and Exhibit 17-P) 
The funds obtained by the mortgage went to Jennifer Day 
Enterprises, a Nevada corporation in which Stan Tanner 
had an interest. (T. 161, 173) Michael Tanner lived in 
the house for a period of one year at which time he moved 
-4-
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out to find a more suitable residence. (T. 181) 
The note signed by Stan Tanner was unpaid at the 
time of trial in the amount of $40,643.00. (R. 76) 
The trial court entered judgment in favor of the 
plaintiffs, Daniel M. Schwartz and Bernice L.Schwartz 
against the defendant, M.D. Haltom, Stan Tanner and Michael 
Tanner for $40,643.00 and $7,500.00 for attorney's fees. 
(R. 80) The Court also awarded the plaintiffs a judgment 
against Stan Tanner for $21,870.29 for interest on the note. 
(R. 80) 
I. 
THE PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PROVE BY CLEAR AND 
CONVINCING EVIDENCE ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF COMMON LAW 
FRAUD ON THE PART OF THE APPELLANT, M. D. HALTOM. 
The plaintiffs had the burden of establishing 
all of the elements of a cause of action of fraud as 
to the appellant,M. D. Haltom, which are according to 
Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P. 2d 273 (1952) as 
follows: 
1. That a representation was made; 
2. Concerning a presently existing material fact; 
3. Which was false; 
4. Which the representor either 
(a) knew to be false, or 
(b) made recklessly, knowing that he had 
sufficient knowledge upon which to base 
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such representation; 
5. For the purpose of inducing the other party 
to act upon it; 
6. That the other party, acting reasonably and 
in belief of its falsity; 
7. Did in fact rely upon it; 
8. And was thereby induced to act; 
9. To his injury and damage. 
The plaintiffs had the burden of proving each and 
every element of conmton law fraud by clear and convincing 
evidence. Lundstrom v. Radio Corporation of America, 17 
Utah 2d 114, 405 P. 2d 339 (1965) and Bezner v. Continental 
Dry Cleaners, Inc. 548 P. 2d 898 (Utah 1976). 
The appellant submits that the evidence presented 
to the trial court does not sustain the finding of liability 
on the basis of fraud against the appellant. 
First, the trial court based the findings of liability 
not upon the willful misrepresentations of fact of the appellant 
as agent of Stan Tanner, or a participant in a company, but 
rather upon the omrnissions of certain facts about the stocks. 
(R. 74) Paragraphs 12 (a), 12 (c), 12 (d), 12 (e), 12 (f), 12 (g), 
12(h), 12(i) and 12(j) of the findings all concern matters 
concerning the various holdings of Stan Tanner which were 
not told to the plaicntiffs in the two hour meeting. (R. ·,4) 
In Elder v. Clawson, 14 Utah 2d 379, 384 P. 2d 802 
(1963) this Court set forth the general rule as to actionable 
-6-
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concealment of the truth. Justice Wade, in his opinion 
quoted 23 Am Jur. aso, Fraud and Deceit, Section 86, 
which stated: 
"Silence in order to be actionable fraud 
must relate to a material matter 
known to the party, whether the duty 
arises from a relation of trust from 
confidence, inequality of condition 
and knowledge, or other attendant 
circumstances •.. (Emphasis added 
by Justice Wade )"394 P. 2d at 804. 
The Court went on to cite the rule that the 
duty to disclose does not arise if the other party could 
fairly discover the information by the exercise of reason-
able diligence. 
In the present case, the transaction in which the 
plaintiffs executed was accomplished on January 2, 1969, while 
the representations made by M. D. Haltom were made on December 
8, 1968. In the intervening period the plaintiffs had the 
time, opportunity and means of finding out all of the matters 
undisclosed by M. D. Haltom concerning the corporations. 
(T. 65, T. 67, and T. 146) Therefore, in light of these facts 
and the fact that this was a business transaction, there 
existed no duty on the part of the appellant to affirmatively 
relate the information to the plaintiffs upon which the 
Court based the liability for fraud. 
Secondly, the ommissions and misstatements specified 
in the trial courts findings of fact, 12(a) through 12(j) are 
not material statements. In light of the facts and cir-
cumstances of the case, this can be determined by composing 
-7-
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the evidence presented by the plaintiff, Daniel Schwartz 
' 
at trial with the instances relied on by the trial court 
in the findings of fact. At trial, the plaintiff primarily 
testified as to the appellant's statements of opinion 
concerning the future progress as to the possible develop-
ment of the corporations. (T. 21 to T. 25) A careful 
reading of the record reveals that the plaintiff was interest 
primarily in the speculative value of the stock add not 
the information cited in the findings of fact. 
The appellant submits that under the standard of 
clear and convincing evidence the plaintiff~ failed to prove 
all of the elements of fraud and therefore, the judgment 
entered against this appellant should be reversed. 
II. 
THE PLAINTIFFS DID NOT EXERCISE DUE CARE IN THEIR 
BUSINESS DEALINGS WITH STAi.~ TANNER AND DID NOT HAVE ANY RIGHT 
TO RELY ON THE STATEMENTS. 
The plaintiff, Daniel Schwartz, was under a duty 
to exercise reasonable care and prudence before entering 
into an "arms-length" business transaction with the 
defendant, Stan Tanner. Lewis v. White 2 Utah 2d 101, 269 
P. 2d 865 (1954). Jardine v. Brunswick Corporation, 18 Utah 
2d 378, 423 P. 2d 659 (1967). If the plaintiff fails to exer-
cise reasonable care to protect his interests then under the 
rule as stated in the foregoing cases, the plaintiff's 
negligence precludes any claim that he reasonably relied on 
-8-
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the representations and the plaintiff could not recover 
in this action. 
In the present case, the plai~tiff had the opport-
unity and ability to independently verify and substantiate 
the value of the stock being offered as security for the 
note. (T. 65) At trial he stated that he contacted a 
broker in New York concerning the value of the stock. (T. 65) 
He also contacted a banker. (T. 67) The plaintiff did not 
have a credit check made of Stan Tanner the person signing 
the note. (T. 67) After the December 8, 1968 meeting, 
and until January 1969 closing the plaintiff had the 
opportunity and ability to investigate the representations 
and determine whether or not he should rely on the information 
communicated to him in the two hour meeting with M. D. Haltom 
concerning the stock of Stan Tanner. 
Furthermore, the plaintiff was represented by 
legal counsel, Alvin I. Smith, who had previously known 
Mr. Stan Tanner and told the plaintiff that the stock 
was speculative stock. (T. 146) The plaintiff relied on the 
representations of Mr. Smith, who had personally made some 
investigations of Bishop Industries stock and who had personally 
purchased some of the stock at the same period of time. (T. 148) 
The appellant submits that in light of the foregoing 
circumstances, the decision of the trial court should be 
reversed because the plaintiff was not entitled to reasonably 
rely on the representations made by M. D. Haltom on behalf 
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of Stan Tanner in selling the property and, therefore, the 
judgment should be reversed. 
III. 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PLAINTIFFS AT 
TRIAL DOES NOT SUSTAIN THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING OF 
APPELLANTS INVOLVEMENT IN A CONSPIRACY. 
The Trial court in the Findings of Fact entered 
in this action based the liability of the appellant, 
M. D. Haltom upon his involvement as a conspirator in 
a plan to defaud the plaintiffs. The trial court found 
in paragraph 5 of the Findings of Fact that Michael Tanner, 
M. D. Haltom, and Stan Tanner had acted at all times in 
concert in a scheme and plan to defraud the plaintiffs. 
(R. 70) 
In the case of Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 
P. 2d 567 (1962) the plaintiffs sought to establish liability 
on the basis of conspiracy to cause a breach of contract. 
The court held that no conspiracy had been proven because 
the evidence had not shown that the parties were engaged 
in a concerted action to cause the breach of contract, nor 
did the evidence show that such action was, in fact, done 
for the group or part of a plan. The court cited as authority 
for this proposition the case of Teamsters, Chauffers & Help~ 
of America Local 222 v. Board of Review, Department of EmplQY: 
ment Security, 10 Utah 2d 63, 348 P. 2d 588 (1960). In the 
Teamsters case,the Court stated the general proposition that 
-10-
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there is no basis for holding a group of persons responsible 
for the acts of one unless it is affirmatively established 
that the group is engaged in a concerted activity and that 
the action of one is, in fact, done for the group as part 
of a plan. 
Because the plaintiffs alleged that there existed 
a conspiracy to defraud, the burden to prove the existence 
of such conspiracy is even greater than most other civil 
cases. In Lundstrom v. Radio Corporation of America, 17 
Utah 2d 339, 405, states the general rule that fraud must 
be proven by the plaintiff by clear and convincing evidence and 
that a cause of action will not lie in mere suspicion or 
innuendo raised by the relationship of the parties. See 
also, Tanner v. Pillsbury Mills, 3 Utah 2d 196, 281 P. 2d 391 
(1955), and Harris v. Capital Records, 50 Cal. Rptr. 539, 
413 P. 2d 139 (1966). 
In the present case, the evidence established that 
M. D. Haltom made the representations to the plaintiffs 
concerning the stock which Stan Tanner was to pledge as 
security for the note. However, the actual purchase was 
made by Stan Tanner and it was Stan Tanner who defaulted 
the note. There is no evidence that M. D. Haltom had 
any knowledge that the note would not be paid at the 
time the statements were made or any other evidence of 
a conspiracy or plan to defraud. 
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CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the foregoing points, the 
appellant, M. D. Haltom, submits the judgment entered in the 
lower court should be reversed and the appellant awarded 
his costs in this matter. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
ROBERT VAN SCIVER 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
M. D. Haltom 
-12-
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